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Publications

  • Competition and Fatigue at Work [1] ( [2]Vera Angelova, Thomas Giebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel) Discussion Paper No. 134, CRC TRR 190, December 2018
  • How Do Sellers Benefit From Buy-It-Now Prices in Ebay Auctions? - an Experimental Investigation [3] (Tim Grebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Sabine Kröger) Discussion Paper No. 97, CRC TRR 190, 16 May 2018
  • Can A Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? Experimental Evidence from Markets for Expert Services [4] (Vera Angelova, Tobias Regner), 2018, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 154, 362-378.
  • Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance? [5]
    (Vera Angelova, Thomas Giebe and Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel), 2018, Economics Letters 166, p. 31-34.
  • Ex-post Optimal Knapsack Procurement [6] (Felix Jarman, Vincent Meisner), Working Paper (2016) 
  • "Buy-It-Now" or "Sell-It-Now" auctions : Effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanism [7] (Tim Grebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Sabine Kröger) Economics Letters, 2016
  • Competitors In Merger Control: Shall They Be Merely Heard Or Also Listened To? [8] (Thomas Giebe and Miyu Lee) Discussion Paper CRC 649: 2015-011
  • "Buy-It-Now" or "Sell-It-Now" auctions : Effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanism [9] (Tim Grebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Sabine Kröger) Discussion Paper CRC 649: 2015-037
  • Consuming your way to efficiency: public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries [10] (Thomas Giebe, Paul Schweinzer), European Journal of Political Economy, 36: 1-12 (2014), for additional results see CESifo Working Paper No. 4228 [11]
  • Probabilistic Procurement Auctions [12] (Thomas Giebe, Paul Schweinzer), Review of Economic Design (forthcoming)
  • Innovation Contests with Entry Auction [13] (Thomas Giebe), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 55: 165-176 (2014)http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0154-x [14]
  • Speculative Partnership Dissolution with Auctions [15] (Thomas Giebe, Ludwig Ensthaler, Jianpei Li), Review of Economic Design, 18(2): 127-150 (2014) [16]
  • All-pay-all aspects of political decision making [17] (Thomas Giebe, Paul Schweinzer), Public Choice, 161: 73-90 (2014)
  • Bayesian Optimal Knapsack Procurement [18] (Thomas Giebe, Ludwig Ensthaler), European Journal of Operational Research, 234 (3): 774-779 (2014) [19]
  • A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint [20], (Thomas Giebe, Ludwig Ensthaler), Research Policy, 43 (1): 179-189 (2014)
  • Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence [21] (Vera Angelova, Olivier Armantier, Giuseppe Attanasi, Yolande Hiriart), Theory and Decision, 77 (4): 531-556 (2014)
  • ‘I'll do it by myself as I knew it all along’: On the failure of hindsight-biased principals to delegate optimally [22] (David Danz, Frank Hüber, Dorothea Kübler, Lydia Mechtenberg and Julia Schmid) Discussion Paper CRC 649: 2013-0079/em>
  • Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game [23] (Vera Angelova, Tobias Regner), 2013, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming.
  • Can Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Threats Foster Cooperation? An Experimental Test of Finite-Horizon Folk Theorems [24] (Vera Angelova, Lisa V. Bruttel, Werner Güth, Ulrich Kamecke), 2013, Economic Inquiry 51 (2), p.1345–1356
  • Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents [25] (Vera Angelova, Werner Güth, Martin G. Kocher), 2012, Labour Economics 19 (1), p. 48-58
  • Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors [26] (Thomas Giebe; Oliver Gürtler), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 81 (2): 403-420 (2012)
    This paper was awarded the "Walther-Rathenau-Preis 2008" of the German Economic Association for Business Administration.
  • Gender Differences in Team Work and Team Competition [27] (Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Dorothea Kübler), 2011, Journal of Economic Psychology, 32: 797–808
  • The High/Low Divide: Self-Selection by Values in Auction Choice [28](Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Tim Salmon), 2011, Games and Economic Behavior, 73 (1), p. 200-214
  • On the evolution of professional consulting [29] (Thomas Gehrig, Werner Güth, Rene Levinsky, Vera Popova), 2010, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 76, p. 113-126
  • License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers [30] (Thomas Giebe; Elmar Wolfstetter), Games and Economic Behaviour, 63 (1): 91–106 (2008)
  • Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game [31] (Dietmar Fehr, Dorothea Kübler and David Danz) Discussion Paper CRC 649: 2008-026/em>
  • Revenue equivalence revisited [32] (Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Tim Salmon), 2008, Games and Economic Behavior, 64: 171–192, This paper was awarded the "Forschungspreis 2008" of the School of Business and Economics, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin
  • Price formation in a sequential selling mechanism [33] (Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Sabine Kröger), 2008, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 67: 823-843
  • Robustness of bidder preferences among auction institutions [34](Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Tim Salmon), 2008, Economic Inquiry, Vol. 46 (3): 335-368
  • How to Allocate R&D and Other Subsidies: An Experimentally Tested Policy Recommendation [35] (Thomas Giebe; Tim Grebe; Elmar Wolfstetter), Research Policy, 35 (9): 1261-1272 (2006) Download instructions and screenshots (PDF, 179,1 KB) [36]
  • Experimental Internet auctions with random information retrieval [37](Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Doron Sonsino), 2006, Experimental Economics, Vol. 9, No. 4
  • Procurement experiments with unknown costs of quality [38] (Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Werner Güth; Sabine Kröger), 2006, Pacific Economic Review, Vol. 11, Issue 2
  • Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study [39](Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Werner Güth; Elmar Wolfstetter), 2005, European Economic Review, 49: 1891-1913
  • Entry fees and endogenous entry in electronic auctions [40] (Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Tim Salmon), 2004, Electronic Markets, Vol. 14, No. 3
  • Bidder preferences among auction institutions [41] (Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Tim Salmon), 2004, Economic Inquiry, Vol. 42, 223-236
  • Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions [42] (Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Doron Sonsino), 2004, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 54/4, 109-131
  • Please, marry me! An experimental study of risking a joint venture [43] (Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Werner Güth; Sigve Tjotta), 2004, Metroeconomica, Vol. 55 (1), 1-21
  • Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs [44] (Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Werner Güth), 2003, Economics Letters, 80, 195-99
  • Investment and bargaining in joint ventures - A family decision making experiment [45] (Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Werner Güth; Matthias Sutter; Hannelore Weck-Hannemann), 2003, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159 (2), 323-341
  • Learning to bid - An experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games [46] (Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Werner Güth; Manfred Königstein; Martin Strobel), 2003, The Economic Journal 113 (487), 477-494
  • Bid functions in auctions and fair division games: Experimental evidence [47] (Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel; Werner Güth; Manfred Königstein; Martin Strobel), 2002, German Economic Review 3 (4), 461-484
  • Auctions and fair division games - A cross-country bidding experiment [48](Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel), 2001, Journal of Socio-Economics 30(4), 367-374
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