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EDUCATION	Ph.D. in Economics, University of Mannheim	(expected) June 2016
	M.Sc. in Economic Research, University of Mannheim	2012
	Visiting Ph.D. student at Yale University	2011 - 2012
	B.Sc. in Economics, University of Mannheim	2010
	Visiting ERASMUS student at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid	fall 2009

RESEARCH INTERESTS Primary: Microeconomic Theory
Secondary: Mechanism Design, Industrial Organization

WORKING PAPERS

Job Market Paper:
“Ex-post Optimal Knapsack Procurement” with Felix Jarman
(R&R Journal of Economic Theory)

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A project’s cost is private information and its value for the designer may vary. In this allocation problem, the number of procured projects is endogenously determined by the mechanism. The designer faces ex-post constraints: The participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome while the mechanism must be implementable in dominant strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms and show that it has a deferred acceptance auction representation. This feature guarantees an implementation with a descending clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks descend synchronously such that the cheapest projects are executed. The case in which values or costs are asymmetrically distributed features a novel tradeoff between quantity and quality. Interestingly, this tradeoff mitigates the distortion due to the informational asymmetry compared to environments where quantity is exogenous.

“Competing for Strategic Buyers”

Although revenue management markets are rarely monopolistic, this assumption is typically made in the literature. In contrast, I consider multiple sellers who in total offer K identical goods to $n > K$ buyers with private persistent valuations. Goods are traded in continuous time before some deadline. All buyers enter the market simultaneously, are fully forward-looking and do not discount. I find that allocations, prices and payoffs are equivalent under monopoly and under oligopoly, whenever the optimal monopoly allocation is efficient. The latter is implied when sellers cannot commit to future prices and the good is sufficiently scarce or when sellers (with or without price commitment) value the good sufficiently less than buyers. In equilibrium, all sellers set identical prices which decrease synchronously and continuously and jump after each sale. There is no incentive to undercut competitors’ prices, because each seller anticipates that, by letting her rivals sell out their goods, she will become a monopolist. However, when sellers want to maintain an exclusive terminal price, prices and industry profits under monopoly are higher compared to oligopoly.

Work in progress:

“Resale with Dynamic Populations”

“Oligopolistic revenue management with myopic buyers”

TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Auction Theory, lecturer (M.Sc.)	(planned) spring 2016
	Principles of Economics, TA (B.Sc.)	fall 2015
	Microeconomics III, TA (Ph.D.)	spring 2013, 2014, 2015
	Auction Theory, TA (M.Sc.)	fall & spring 2013, fall 2014
	Microeconomics A, TA (B.Sc.)	spring 2011

SCHOLAR- SHIPS	Ph.D. scholarship, CDSE Mannheim	2012 - 2013, 2015-2016
	DAAD scholarship, ISAP program	2011 - 2012
	ERASMUS scholarship	fall 2009

PRESEN- TATIONS	Ex-post Optimal Knapsack Procurement	
	ENTER MaCCI-TSE workshop 2014, Mannheim	
	UECE Lisbon Meetings 2014, Lisbon	
	TSE Brown Bag Seminar 2015, Toulouse	
	EEA 2015 (poster), Mannheim	

Competing for Strategic Buyers

11th SFB/TR15 Young Researchers Workshop 2015, Bonn

12th SFB/TR15 Young Researchers Workshop 2015, Munich

